Systematically exploited in political and media discourse to explain the causes of far too many shipwrecks, the figure of the smuggler is at the centre of States’ concerns in terms of migration policy. To solve the problem of illegal immigration, we must fight against smugglers. And if, ultimately, smugglers were only a response to European migration policy governed by multiple surveillance systems at external borders. Faced with this impenetrable fortress, smugglers position themselves as experts and offer their services to those who wish to cross it.
This article addresses the role of the smuggler in migration by analysing the political discourse around this common enemy that he must fight. He is interested in the protection mechanisms at the border leading to the deadly cataclysm, and questions the effectiveness of the migration policies of community states.
The European border: a doubly militarised zone
Following the shipwreck of October 3, 2013 off the coast of Lampedusa during which more than 300 migrants died, the Italian military rescue operation Mare Nostrum was created to respond to relief needs in the Mediterranean area. A very expensive operation, the amount of which was largely borne by the Italian government, it ended up being replaced by Frontex’s Operation Triton. If the first had the mission of rescuing people at sea, the second targets the security and protection of the community area by collaborating with neighbouring extra-community countries. This paradigm focused on the protection of community countries and on the hunt for irregular entries supposed to be a deterrent, however, has very little impact on the number of departures to the European continent and condemns people to undertake dangerous migration in order to escape controls.
In this doubly militarised zone where both sides of the border exercise control, the power to cross constitutes a force that is monetised by individuals, called smugglers. Stakeholders in vast criminal networks, the latter put their knowledge of the border territory at the service of people wishing to cross the area by imposing their conditions: cost and method of payment, place and time of departure, means of transport and itinerary. These requirements vary depending on the porosity of the border and the level of control carried out by the authorities.
The tighter borders strengthen criminal networks
The integrated restrictions on legal immigration, synonymous with this hardening, reinforce clandestine dynamics. In France, the new “immigration” law of January 2024 is a systemic example of the European political climate regarding migratory flows. From now on, immigration “Talent” immigration for the most highly-qualified now requires a master diploma or equivalent; immigration for study purposes, which is now the most important form of immigration, is conditional on a deposit from the student; family immigration, for its part, has fallen considerably with the tightening of immigration conditions (length of prior stay in the country, financial self-sufficiency, housing, etc.), and lastly, immigration for protection purposes (asylum) is relatively low and increasingly difficult to obtain, given the many suspicions of “false migration”.
This is justified by the fact that current migrations do not meet reasonable migration criteria, that the countries of origin are safe, and that there is no need to grant asylum, or that France already has too many migrants. While legal channels are shrinking, illegal channels are expanding, and the use of smugglers is growing. As authors Raphaël Krafft and Marie Cosnay explained in an article published in Le Monde in December 2021, “the smuggler is the symptom of closed borders, not the cause of migratory movements”.
The illegal crossing market
Today, the illegal immigrant smuggling market is worth billions of euros, and is organised into a network that governments are struggling to dismantle. In the face of tightening borders, this veritable “migration business” (Rodier, 2014) is securing itself and organising itself around a “safe” system, such as giving the helm to a passenger on the boat. These “unwilling smugglers” find themselves in this situation, because they don’t have enough money to pay for the journey, find themselves forced by the smugglers when it’s time to board, or forced to take the helm to shipwreck. Once in Europe, some are imprisoned for “illegal border crossing” because they were observed steering the boat, or because other passengers testified against them in the hope that this would facilitate once they arrive in Europe.
In the relentless fight against smugglers, whose acts have been considered felonies rather than misdemeanours since January 2024, accused individuals are liable to sentences of up to 20 years’ imprisonment. Once again, the severity of the sentence, justified by its priori dissuasive character, does not seem to be having any effect on criminal networks, which continue to expand as borders tighten. What’s more, most of the people smugglers represent only the small hands – in other words, an easily replaceable workforce. In this context, it’s not usually the network leaders who get arrested.
For legal and safe routes
Despite the many deaths worldwide (the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) counts 8,565 dead or missing migrants for the year 2023), people continue to migrate and try their luck, knowing the risks. European policies systematically respond to shipwrecks with new anti-immigration and anti-passenger policies. The benefits of these laws have yet to be proven, but the dead are there. On the contrary, criminal networks have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to reinvent themselves in order to survive in the illegal passage market. The hunt for smugglers will not reduce the number of migrants who die trying to flee their countries, whether by land or sea, and kills.
In an article published in Le Monde on September 17, 2024, numerous human rights associations and organisations, including Cimade, CCFD-Terre solidaire and Emmaüs Roya, called on the French and British governments to condemn their complicity in the murders at sea, and called for the reintroduction of legal channels and a welcoming migration policy to put an end to the vicious circle of illegality in which migrants are trapped once they arrive in Europe.
References
Audureau W., Dagorn G., Ferrer M., Geoffroy R., Imbach R., Maad A., Pariente J. ““Immigration” law: additions, strengthening, censorship… all the developments of the text, from the initial draft to the final version » Le Monde (2024)
Cosnay M., Krafft R., “The smuggler is the syndrome of closed borders, not the cause of migratory movements” Le Monde (2021).
Dumont J., “Channel crossings: to get around the restrictions, smugglers resorted to boats from China” Info Migrants (2022)
Geisser V., “Mediterranean, “morte nostrum”: a terrorism of indifference? » Migrations Society (2015)
Hutton M., “Migrants: are smugglers primarily responsible for shipwrecks? » TV5 Monde (2021)
Krafft R., “Smugglers in spite of themselves: from the beaches of Libya to the prisons of Sicily” France culture (2018)
Le Boisselier V., “These exiles condemned as smugglers” Politis (2022)
Le Monde, “Shipwrecks of the Channel: Franco-British migration policy is deadly, and it is not up to associations to compensate for its inconsistency” (2024)
Perrigueur E., “In France, restrictive laws which invalidate the theory of the pull of air” Le Monde Diplomatique (2022)
Radio France, “What remains of legal immigration flights in Europe? » (2024)
Rodier C., “The business of migration” Plein Droit (2014)
